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Abstract
In one of the most influential works of the twentieth century, The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus writes this:
“This heart within me I can feel, and I judge that it exists. This world I can touch, and I likewise judge that it
exists. There ends all my knowledge, and the rest is construction.” Here, Camus addresses what he believes to
be one of the main sources of the absurd: the limitations of human reason. He claims that his inability to fully
understand human reality creates a gap between his existence and its meaning, and, in effect, renders the
whole of human experience as absurd. Because Camus makes these conclusions from a purely atheistic
position, it would seem that his notion of the absurd is incompatible with a theistic understanding of the
human condition. Interestingly, however, the main speaker of the ancient Hebrew wisdom book Ecclesiastes,
Qohelet, also concludes that the limits of human knowledge give life a sense of absurdity. Although Camus
(an atheist) and Qohelet (a theist) begin with different assumptions regarding the existence of God—the very
Being who gives meaning and clarity to his creation—their similar conclusions reveal an unlikely
compatibility between atheistic and theistic attitudes towards the human predicament. While Camus and
Qohelet recognize that the world cannot be explained by human reasoning, and is therefore absurd, they each
conclude that uncertainty and human limitations may prompt a certain liberation and solace that allows them
to move beyond the absurd. This curious parallel between Camus’s modern existential attitudes in The Myth of
Sisyphus and the ancient Hebraic wisdom of Ecclesiastes show that the awareness of the limitation of human
reason may compel man to live authentically and passionately despite the seeming unreasonableness of his
life.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In one of the most influential works of the twentieth century, The Myth of 
Sisyphus, Albert Camus writes this: “This heart within me I can feel, and I judge 
that it exists. This world I can touch, and I likewise judge that it exists. There ends 
all my knowledge, and the rest is construction.”1 Here, Camus addresses what he 
believes to be one of the main sources of the absurd: the limitations of human 
reason. He claims that his inability to fully understand human reality creates a gap 
between his existence and its meaning, and, in effect, renders the whole of human 
experience as absurd. Because Camus makes these conclusions from a purely 
atheistic position, it would seem that his notion of the absurd is incompatible with a 
theistic understanding of the human condition. Interestingly, however, the main 
speaker of the ancient Hebrew wisdom book Ecclesiastes, Qohelet, also concludes 
that the limits of human knowledge give life a sense of absurdity. Although Camus 
(an atheist) and Qohelet (a theist) begin with different assumptions regarding the 
existence of God—the very Being who potentially gives meaning and clarity to his 
creation—their similar conclusions reveal an unlikely compatibility between 
atheistic and theistic attitudes towards the human predicament. While Camus and 
Qohelet recognize that the world cannot be explained by human reasoning, and is 
therefore absurd, they each conclude that uncertainty and human limitations may 
prompt a certain liberation and solace that allows them to move beyond the absurd. 
This curious parallel between Camus’ modern existential attitudes in The Myth of 
Sisyphus and the ancient Hebraic wisdom of Ecclesiastes show that the awareness 
of the limitation of human reason may compel man to live authentically and 
passionately despite the seeming unreasonableness of his life.  
 
CAMUS’ PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSURD 
 
Camus begins The Myth of Sisyphus with the following unnerving 
statements:  
 
There is but one truly philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging 
whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental 
question of philosophy. All the rest—whether or not the world has three 
dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories—comes 
afterwards. These are games; one must first answer.2 
 
It is clear from these opening lines that Camus is interested in the most crucial of 
questions: the question of human existence, the meaning-of-life itself. He later 
stresses that “the meaning of life is the most urgent of questions,”3 and before any 
                                                        
1 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: Vintage, 1960), 19. 
2 Ibid., 3. 
3 Ibid., 4. 
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sensitive human being determines how to live, he must decide whether he should 
live in the first place; he must determine if living is “worth the trouble.”4  
In raising these questions, Camus addresses one of the central predicaments 
of the modern man: the absurd. “The absurd,” he writes, “is born of this 
confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world.”5 
The absurd is not found in man or in a godless universe, but in their coexistence, in 
the tension between two polarized realities: the reality that man demands the world 
to make sense, and the reality that the world is irrational. The absurd is, 
essentially, the final product of an unmet expectation, an upset possibility, an 
unfulfilled desire—man demands that there be meaning in life, clarity and purpose 
in this world, but the universe is silent and indifferent to his demands.  
In his description of the absurd, Camus suggests that one of the main sources 
of the absurd is the limitation of human reason, and, perhaps more specifically, the 
expectation for human reason to provide clarity and cohesion to make sense of the 
world and human experiences. Camus, however, asserts that both uncertainty and 
unintelligibility make man question his meaning and purpose in life, and, therefore 
render human existence nonsensical: “Everything,” he finally says, “contributes to 
the spreading of confusion;”6 the lack of knowledge prohibits man from grasping the 
meaning of things, if there is any meaning to be grasped at all, and the limits of 
human reason, in turn, make the world irrational. In addition to the notion that 
man’s reason and ability to grasp reality is limited, Camus’ equally expresses his 
desire and longing to understand the nature of his world: man “feels within him his 
longing for happiness and for reason;” man longs for meaning and purpose, but he 
“stands face to face with the irrational;” he longs for reason, but “[t]this world in 
itself is not reasonable, that is all that can be said…what is absurd is the 
confrontation of this irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in 
the human heart.”7 He expresses the disappointment he feels when this longing is 
not satisfied: “I want everything to be explained to me or nothing. And the reason is 
impotent when it hears this cry from the heart. The mind aroused by this insistence 
seeks and finds nothing but contradictions and nonsense. What I fail to understand 
is nonsense.”8 One of the most important passages concerning Camus’ attitude 
toward the limits of human reason needs to be quoted in its entirety: 
 
What I know, what is certain, what I cannot deny, what I cannot reject—this 
is what counts. I can negate everything of that part of me that lives on vague 
nostalgias, except this desire for unity, this longing to solve, this need for 
clarity and cohesion. I can refute everything in the world surround me that 
offends or enraptures me, except this chaos, this sovereign chance, and this 
divine equivalence with springs from anarchy. I do not know if this world has 
                                                        
4 Ibid., 5 
5 Ibid., 28. 
6 Ibid., 8. 
7 Ibid., 28. 
8 Ibid., 27. 
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a meaning which transcends it. But I do know that, if such a meaning exists, 
I do not know it and that it is impossible me just now to know it.9 
 
Camus even admits that the “feeling of absurdity” itself is “elusive,”10 and thus this 
“feeling of absurdity” makes man an “alien” and “stranger” to himself, to his fellow 
men, and to the world.11 Essentially, as he confronts the absurd, man becomes fully 
aware of both his condition and fate: he is born (without his permission) into a 
world (of which he does not approve) with no inherent meaning or purpose (though 
he desires them) and he is condemned to struggle through an ephemeral existence 
of anxiety and suffering that only guarantees a grave. Man realizes that he is 
neither home nor homebound, but homeless in both life and death, forever lost in a 
universe of no inherent meaning or truth. Human existence, Camus concludes, is 
nothing more than a meaningless and momentary “field of being.”12 
It is both this consciousness of and confrontation with the absurd that compel 
Camus—or any honest person for that matter—to determine whether or not life is 
worth living at all. The tension and discrepancy between desire and reality, and 
that hopeless longing for an irrational world to be rational, lead Camus to face the 
problem of suicide: “Does the absurd dictate death?”13 Should man continue living in 
an inherently meaningless universe? “This problem,” Camus asserts, “must be given 
priority over others, outside all methods of thought and all exercises of the 
disinterested mind.”14 The answer to this question, for Camus, is both simple and 
complex; the problem, he says, “may seem both simple and insoluble.”15 In the 
preface to The Myth of Sisyphus,16 Camus states clearly that he will address the 
“problem of suicide…without the aid of eternal values.”17 His conclusion: “The 
answer, underlying and appearing through the paradoxes which cover it, is this: 
even if one does not believe in God, suicide is not legitimate.”18 Camus responds to 
the problem of the absurd without the need of God, but instead with a description of 
his ideal man—the absurd man. He argues that despite the evils, uncertainties, and 
absurdities of a godless universe, the absurd man can still accept and live in a world 
without ultimate purpose. The absurd man may valiantly evade the illegitimate act 
of suicide by embracing the struggle of life and choosing to live an authentic and 
passionate life. Suicide, to Camus, is dishonest and a cowardly rejection of freedom; 
it is confession and surrender, and if a man kills himself he can no longer honestly 
                                                        
9 Ibid., 38. 
10 Ibid., 11. 
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 William Barrett, Irrational Man (New York: Anchor, 1990), 220. 
13 Camus, Myth 9.  
14 Ibid., 9. 
15 Ibid., 6. 
16 This preface first appeared in Justin O’Brien’s English translation in 1955, fifteen years 
after Camus wrote The Myth of Sisyphus. 
17 Ibid., v. 
18 Ibid., v. 
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confront the absurd, and therefore he is overcome by fate itself.19  
 
CONNECTING CAMUS AND QOHELET 
 
In light of the above points, there is no doubt that atheism is at the 
foundation of Camus’ thought; in fact, Camus acknowledges that the very absence 
of God makes life both incoherent and meaningless: “Up to now man derived his 
coherence from his Creator. But from the moment that he consecrates his rupture 
with Him, he finds himself delivered over to the fleeting moment, the passing days, 
and to wasted sensibility.”20 The rejection of a God-Creator; the disbelief in the 
afterlife; the loss of hope and eternal values; the view that life is meaningless and 
human action is futile—these claims describe the world of a man without God. 
Camus devoted much of his literary work to critiquing religion, namely the claims of 
Christianity, and many of his works contain anti-religious undertones. The Rebel 
and The Plague, for example, focus on the incomprehensible fact that useless evil 
and suffering exist in a god-governed world, and that Christianity itself cannot fight 
against injustice without fighting against the very God who allows it. The absurd 
heroes of The Stranger, The Plague, and Caligula are unapologetic atheists who 
both reject Christianity and judge its values and doctrines as useless and 
contradictory. Yet even though Camus denies the existence of God, eternal values, 
and an afterlife, he asserts that the absurd man can embrace the meaninglessness 
of life and still find fulfillment in his existence. To a theist, who receives his 
meaning from God, this response may not entirely make sense.  
But it is exactly this response, this will to live in the face of the absurd, that 
makes the atheist Camus curiously similar to the theist Qohelet21 in the Old 
Testament book Ecclesiastes. Richard Akeroyd notes that there is a “striking 
similarity between the thoughts of Sisyphus about the absurdity of life and the 
words of Solomon concerning vanity in Ecclesiastes. Both conclude that, from man’s 
standpoint at least, life is a closed cycle with no evident purpose…; but both also 
agree that there is contentment to be found in living.”22 What is peculiar about this 
similarity is that, unlike the modern atheistic framework of Camus’ writings, 
ancient Hebraic wisdom literature emerged from a pre-modern culture rooted in the 
belief in God. However, although Ecclesiastes was written approximately 935 
                                                        
19 Ibid., 5. 
20 Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bowar (New York: Vintage, 1960), 51. 
21 There is much debate over the exact authorship of Ecclesiastes. Many scholars attribute 
Solomonic authorship while others argue for either an unknown writer before or after Solomon 
simply known as Qohelet. Due to the ambiguity of and general disagreements on authorship, 
scholars and commentators often use the Hebrew qohelet as used in the original text, which literally 
means “public speaker,” “gatherer” or “debater,” but translates as “preacher” or “teacher” in most 
English translations. For the purpose of this paper, exact authorship or an in-depth biographical 
study is not a primary concern, thus I will use “Qohelet.” 
22 Richard H. Akeroyd, The Spiritual Quest of Albert Camus (Tuscaloosa, AL: Portals, 1976), 
25. 
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B.C.,23 nearly three millennia before the modern period, its themes and tones sound 
curiously modern; the main speaker, Qohelet, wrestles with human predicaments 
that would later define Western man of the twentieth century: alienation, anxiety, 
and doubt caused by confrontation with the absurdity of suffering and death.24 
Despite his belief in God, Qohelet outlines the despair and uncertainty that he has 
experienced throughout his life “under the sun,” the same feelings of absurdity 
Camus expresses in The Myth of Sisyphus.     
An important parallel between these two works lies in the meaning and 
usage of the word “absurd” itself. In his notable work Qohelet and his 
Contradictions, Michael V. Fox translates the Hebrew hebel (meaningless or vanity) 
as synonymous to Camus’ “absurd.” Fox argues that both Qohelet and Camus 
describe the world and the human predicament in a similar way. Fox defines both 
hebel and “absurd” as “a disparity between two phenomena that are supposed to be 
joined by a link of harmony or causality but are actually disjunct or even 
conflicting.”25 The phrase “supposed to be” in Fox’s definition suggests that the 
absurd is the result of a disappointment or an unmet expectation; life is absurd 
because life is not as it is “supposed to be.” Interestingly, both the absurd man—an 
atheist—and Qohelet—a theist—realize this unmet expectation. In “The Meaning of 
Hebel for Qohelet,” Fox argues that the discrepancy Qohelet discovers between his 
expectations and reality is the same feeling of absurdity for Sisyphus. Fox also links 
this feeling of absurdity to the limitations of human reason. Both Camus’ “absurd” 
and Qohelet’s hebel, he explains, are “an affront to reason, in the broad sense of the 
human faculty that looks for order in the world about us. The quality of absurdity 
does not inhere in a being, act, or event in and of itself (though these may be called 
‘absurd’), but rather in the tension between a certain reality and a framework of 
expectations.”26 Fox also explains that “to call something ‘absurd’ is to claim a 
certain understanding of its nature: it is contrary to reason.”27  
On a separate but similar note, Northrop Frye makes the important point 
that Qohelet uses hebel metaphorically, as a “metaphorical kernel of fog, mist, 
vapor, or breath.”28 Frye concludes that while Qohelet figuratively describes all of 
human experience as a mist or vapor, he literally means that all things are “full of 
                                                        
23 Many Bible historians disagree on the exact date of the authorship. Some scholars argue 
for a date as late as 935 B.C.E. while others argue for a date as early as 175 to 150 B.C.E. I 
personally take the view of an early ninth century B.C.E. date. But, like the authorship, the exact 
date of the text is not a primary concern for the purpose of this paper.  
24 Donald A. Crosby notes that “the Book of Ecclesiastes predates by over two thousand years 
the emergence of the ‘modern mind’ (119). Tremper Longman III describes Qohelet as sounding 
“incredibly modern. He express[es] the uncertainty and anxiety of our own age” (xiii); he “sounds so 
modern because he so vividly captures the despair of a world without God. The difference, though, is 
that the modern world believes that God does not exist; Qohelet believed that God existed but 
questioned his love and concern” (40). 
25 Michael V. Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, (Decatur, GA: Almond, 1989), 31.  
26 Fox, “The Meaning of Hebel for Qohelet,” Journal of Biblical Literature 105. 3 (September 
1986), 409, emphasis mine.  
27 Ibid., 413, emphasis mine.  
28 Northrop Frye, The Great Code: the Bible and Literature (Toronto: APC, 1982), 123).  
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emptiness,”29 including the benefits and purposes of gaining knowledge and seeking 
wisdom. Frye links this metaphor of fog to the notion of emptiness and thus 
concludes that Qohelet sees life as a mystery and something to find a way through, 
“and that the way of wisdom is the way out.”30 This, however, as I shall point out, is 
exactly what makes life “absurd” for Qohelet and Camus; the very solution to the 
riddle of life—the very hope that man might make sense of the world through 
wisdom, reason, knowledge—is in itself essentially futile, for human reason and 
knowledge do not, as Camus and Qohelet discover, finally help man grasp the 
fullness of reality.  
As I have been suggesting thus far, human reason by itself, according to 
Camus, cannot explain or interpret the absurdities of the world: “Reason may 
describe nature but cannot explain it…To the man who will not forget his 
confrontation with the absurd, ‘reason is vain and there is nothing beyond 
reason.’”31 Camus and his philosophy of the absurd, therefore, are “interested in 
pointing to the inadequacy of reason,”32 and like Camus, Qohelet is a skeptic of 
human reason and seriously doubts the purpose or advantage of seeking concrete 
knowledge in an abstract world. In 8.16-17, he addresses man’s inability to grasp 
the workings of God when he says, “When I applied my heart to know wisdom, and 
to see the business that is done on earth, how neither day nor night do one’s eyes 
see sleep, then I saw all the work of God, that man cannot find out the work that is 
done under the sun. However much man may toil in seeking, he will not find it out. 
Even though a wise man claims to know, he cannot find it out.”33 He states in 3.10-
12, “I have seen the business that God has given to the children of man to be busy 
with. He has made everything beautiful in its time. Also, he has put eternity into 
man's heart, yet so that he cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to 
the end” (emphasis mine). In one passage in particular, Qohelet not only expresses 
his frustration with the fact that the knowledge and wisdom he has acquired—that 
is, what he has seen, observed, and experienced—cannot solve the problems that he 
faces, but also the fact that this is the way in which God has willed it. In 1.13-15, he 
states:  
 
And I applied in my heart to seek and to search out by wisdom all that is 
done under heaven. It is an unhappy business that God has given to the 
children of man to be busy with. I have seen everything that is done under 
the sun, and behold, all is vanity and a striving after wind. What is crooked 
cannot be made straight, and what is lacking cannot be counted. 
 
Here, it is not just the nature of the world or the human condition that is absurd to 
                                                        
29 Ibid., 123.  
30 Ibid., 124. 
31 Barnes, 166. 
32 Ibid., 166. 
33 Here and hereafter, scripture verses are quoted from The Holy Bible: English Standard 
Version: Containing the Old and New Testaments (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2002). 
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Qohelet, but the very acts of God himself. Fox notes that Qohelet describes “God's 
will” as “not merely mysterious and inscrutable,” but “a violation of reason.”34 
Qohelet realizes that man is unable to understand the full nature of things or 
predict the future, and this fact is an “affront to his reason,” his desires, and his 
expectations.  
Qohelet also addresses the limits of human reason through a series of 
rhetorical questions. The Hebrew phrase mi yodea, translated as the rhetorical 
question “who knows?”, occurs four times throughout the book, expressing a 
skeptical and negative view of knowledge and human capabilities. In 2.19 Qohelet 
asks, “And who knows whether he will be a wise man or a fool?” In 3.21 he asks, 
“Who knows whether the spirit of man goes upward and the spirit of the beast goes 
down into the earth?” In 8.7 he states, “For he does not know what is to be, for who 
can tell him how it will be?” In 6.12 he connects this epistemological skepticism 
with the meaninglessness of life through his use of the word “shadow”: “For who 
knows what is good for a man during his lifetime, during the few years of his futile 
life? He will spend them like a shadow. For who can tell a man what will be after 
him under the sun?” The word “shadow” here emphasizes the “frailty of human 
beings,” “brevity of human life,” and “ephemerality.”35 If man is but a shadow or 
dark passing existence “under the sun,” then his life does not give him the efficient 
time he needs in order to know how he should live. This is the same realization 
Camus expresses when he speaks of the uncertainty of the future yet the certainty 
that “there is no afterlife.”36 For Qohelet, the existence of a superior God juxtaposed 
to the existence of depraved human beings does not immediately unify life but 
makes life more complex and mysterious. Humans live entrapped in the earthly 
realm, left to deal with its problems and evils: “Life with its difficulties and 
vicissitudes as a result of the Fall is a puzzle that finite man cannot figure out and 
it frustrates [him] in his search for meaning and purpose. In his attempt to master 
life, Qohelet eventually realizes with defeated expectations that he cannot 
understand God’s scheme of things.”37 Like Qohelet, Camus concludes that “nothing 
is clear, all is chaos, that all man has is his lucidity and his definite knowledge of 
the walls surround him.”38 What Qohelet and Camus are certain of is their 
uncertainty; what they do know is that they do not know. Yet despite their 
ignorance and uncertainty, they both feel a similar longing to rise up and see what 
lies on the “other side of the curtain,” to discover what is “behind the universe,” all 
the while realizing that the mind of man is crippled and cannot find these things 
out. Man’s ignorance of the meaning of his life, as well as his ignorance of his own 
present duties and future destiny, renders his existence as absurd—he is utterly 
directionless and feels disconnected from his world and creator.  
                                                        
34 Fox, “The Meaning” 425.  
35 Tremper Longman III, The Book of Ecclesiastes (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmam, 
1998), 178.  
36 Camus, Myth 58.  
37 Robert McCabe, “The Message of Ecclesiastes,” DBSJ 1 (Spring 1996), 92. 
38 Camus, Myth 27.  
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 Throughout Ecclesiastes, Qohelet complains about the same problems and 
anxieties caused by the same uncertainty and a lack of knowledge that Camus 
addresses in length.  One Old Testament scholar explains that Qohelet “denies that 
it is possible to know what is good in life” and “rejects the possibility of knowing the 
absolute good over against the relative good.”39 This uncertainty is a problem for 
man for two reasons. First, without the knowledge of goodness, how can man be 
good without knowing what is good? Secondly, even if he were to have the 
knowledge of goodness, how would he know that this is what he should pursue? 
That man feels directionless in a world he cannot already fully comprehend is a 
twofold absurdity. Interestingly, however, Qohelet suggests that more knowledge 
and certainty would only increase his experience of the absurd and thus create in 
him more alienation and angst. He says in 1.18, “For in much wisdom is much 
vexation, and he who increases knowledge increases sorrow.” Here, it seems that as 
a man grows more knowledgeable of the world, more aware of his existence and the 
condition of his reality, there is more dissatisfaction and mental agony. But it is 
here that we may begin to see how the limits of human reason become liberating 
and practical. This important notion, however, I will address later. 
 What seems to upset Qohelet’s expectations the most, or what is perhaps to 
him the most staggering “affront to reason,” is that both the wise man and the fool 
experience the same destiny, the same troubles; though one obtains knowledge and 
the other resides in the dark, both experience the same inadequacies of their mortal 
and finite conditions. In 2.14-17 Qohelet states: 
 
The wise person has his eyes in his head, but the fool walks in darkness. And 
yet I perceived that the same event happens to all of them. Then I said in my 
heart, ‘What happens to the fool will happen to me also. Why then have I 
been so very wise?’…How the wise dies just like the fool! O I hated life, 
because what is done under the sun was grievous to me, for all is vanity and 
a striving after wind.  
 
Qohelet’s search for truth and meaning is utterly pointless because his fate is the 
same as the fool’s. Because Qohelet, despite his wisdom, exists on the same level as 
the irrational man, he concludes that even knowledge and the certainty of things 
are ultimately meaningless; wisdom and knowledge serve no ultimate purpose or 
offer no true benefit. In a similar vein, Qohelet is dumbfounded “that there are 
righteous people to whom it happens according to the deeds of the wicked, and there 
are wicked people to whom it happens according to the deeds of the righteous.”40 
Here is the ever-problematic question, “why do bad things happen to good people?” 
This reversal of consequence and expectation is a complete irrationality, an absolute 
contradiction to reason. The absurdity of existence for Qohelet seems to come from 
the fact that the very God of all reason creates human experiences that neither 
                                                        
39 Longman, 178.  
40 8.17.  
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make sense nor consist of the conclusions that reason leads us to expect. 
 
TRANSCENDING THE ABSURD THROUGH THE HEBRAIC TRADITION  
 
But how do Camus and Qohelet reconcile their will to live passionately with 
the absurd and their longing for clarity? How do they transcend the limitations of 
human reason and the logical consequences of the absurd—that life is 
meaningless—and still conclude that life should still be lived? If reason can describe 
nature but cannot explain the apparent absurdities of human experience, how can a 
mere awareness of the absurd lead one to embrace existence? Is the affirmation of 
life a legitimate possibility for the limited and alienated individual? Camus and 
Qohelet have certainly discovered a path through the maze of confusion. 
Furthermore, they have conjured enough commitment to their earthly lives in order 
to embrace its brokenness. To begin to understand their responses, we must look 
deeply into the foundations and origins of their philosophical thought. Though 
Camus’s philosophical heritage is clearly in the Greco-Roman-Western tradition, he 
is influenced by the Hebraic tradition via Christianity. In fact, it is very helpful to 
understand Camus’ conclusions as a thinker in the Hebraic tradition. Matthew 
Arnold and William Barrett’s classic and insightful analyses of Hebraism and 
Hellenism illuminate the parallels between Camus and Qohelet. 
In his classic set of critical essays, Culture and Anarchy, Matthew Arnold 
defines Hebraism and Hellenism as two major forces that have shaped Western 
culture. Throughout the history of Western man, these two traditions have been the 
most fundamental paradigms through which one attempts to overcome the barriers, 
limitations, and finitude of his condition. They are, explains Arnold, essentially 
“spiritual disciplines” through which man seeks authentic existence and harmony 
with himself, whose final aim is “man’s perfection or salvation.”41 Though these 
traditions move toward a common end, their means and values differ greatly. The 
Hellenist discovers authentic existence specifically through abstraction, reason, and 
knowledge.42 He praises understanding, the act of “knowing” (specifically knowing 
the grounds, meaning, and purpose for right acting) and “clear intelligence.”43 The 
Hebraic tradition, on the other hand, seeks to avoid abstractions and focuses 
instead on a concrete way of living. It consists of an “energy driving at practice,” a 
“paramount sense of the obligation of duty, self-control, and work, this earnestness 
in going manfully with the best light we have, as one force.”44 For the Hebrew, 
authentic existence arises out of the “exercise of will,” in his passionate, practical, 
and productive living.45  
It is precisely in this distinction between the man of passion and the man of 
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reason that the modern Camus parallels the ancient Qohelet. In Irrational Man, 
Barrett argues that modern existential thought finds its roots in the Hebraic 
tradition. He traces the origins and developments of existentialism by examining 
the central distinction between Hellenism and Hebraism: the difference between 
knowing and doing.  Barrett notes that the Hebraic man is “concerned with practice, 
the Greek with knowledge. Right conduct is the ultimate concern of the Hebrew, 
right thinking that of the Greek.”46 The biblical Hebraic man, figures such as 
Abraham, Job, the psalmists, and Qohelet, does not rely on human reason in order 
to discover the meaning and essence of life—that which transcends the human 
world. Instead, the Hebrew realizes the inadequacy of his reason and his inability to 
know fully the ways of God. He chooses to exist in that inadequacy in order to 
accept his limitations and lack of knowledge. “The Hebrew,” Barrett explains, 
“proceeds not by way of reason but by the confrontation of the whole man … in the 
fullness and violence of his passion with the unknowable and overwhelming God.”47 
The key word here that helps us connect the modern Camus to the ancient Hebrew 
writer is “confrontation.” Through a confrontation with their limited condition and 
the absurd, Camus and Qohelet experience a true moment of enlightenment, an 
honest interaction with reality. Thus, it is through this confrontation—the struggle 
of life itself—that man may know who he is in the world. What once darkened the 
mind of man enlightens him. Qohelet’s authentic confrontation with reality is 
echoed centuries later in Camus’ modern world. Robert Royal convincingly argues in 
“The Other Camus,” that the “radical confrontation with the absurd was an 
absolute necessity in the 20th century, but only as a first step toward a fuller vision 
of human meaning and value.”48  
Arnold and Barrett’s description of the Hebraic tradition explains Qohelet’s 
ironic reaction to the vanity of his life and Camus’ life-affirming response to the 
absurd. Each thinker seeks salvation from his alienation. Camus seeks a means to 
evade suicide and find the strength to live a meaningless life. Qohelet longs for a 
sense of value in his daily toil and seeks answers for the contradictions and 
injustices he witnesses. Once they have realized their limitations and that life 
works against their reason, they must seek a legitimate means to exist. They must 
choose a mode of being-in-the-world. For the Hebrew, his emphasis on right practice 
and passionate living is born of his inadequate thinking. He cannot see things as 
they really are through reason; he overcomes alienation rather through the blood 
and bones of his physical life, through anger, confusion, and fear, and through his 
fervent bond with the Being whom he can never entirely, intellectually know. This 
kind of knowledge a man has only through living, not reasoning, and even in the 
end he cannot always say what exactly it is that he knows.49 
These notions of the Hebraic man also translate into Camus’ attitude toward 
the modern predicament. He ultimately rejects the Hellenistic path of knowing as a 
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way of being-in-the-world, and thus becomes a man of action–a man of doing. 
Camus once remarked: “I am not a philosopher, because I don’t believe in reason 
enough to believe in a system. What interests me is knowing how we must 
behave.”50 Although much of Western philosophy has been an attempt to “make 
everything clear,” Camus considers it “logically impossible to construct an absolute 
and exclusive view of reality.”51 However, this logical impossibility does not lead to 
a nihilistic denial of reality or a philosophy of despair, but rather a positive freedom 
that allows man to recognize and embrace a realistic view of life; a view that 
necessitates action and participation in order to authenticate human existence. 
Though he realizes the limits of the mind, Camus concludes that man should not 
limit his body and negate life through passivity; he understands that although he 
does not find meaning and clarity, “[t]he mind, when it reaches its limits, must 
make a judgment and choose its conclusions.”52 Action consequentially follows as 
limitation gives man occasion to exert his will; to eject himself from the stagnant 
domain of reflective abstraction. Instead he creates a concrete world in which he 
may live and move and breathe. Camus finds that the constant and conscious 
awareness that he cannot grasp the fullness of reality does not imprison him, but 
liberates him from the burden of knowing.  
All of this implies that though Camus and Qohelet begin with the absurd or 
hebel as an all-encompassing fact of human reality, they do not end there. Camus 
once criticized anyone for “thinking that life is tragic because it is wretched,” and 
instead argued that the “realization that life is absurd cannot be an end in itself but 
only a beginning…It is not the discovery which is interesting…but the consequences 
and rules for actions which can be drawn from it.”53 Camus is not so much 
concerned with what causes absurdity as he is with its effects; he focuses on how 
man should respond to it. He recognizes that his absurd condition “awakens 
consciousness and provokes what follows.”54 He admits that the very certainty of his 
uncertainty unlocks the truth of his condition, that the “inability to understand 
becomes the existence that illuminates everything.”55 Shandon L. Guthrie also 
points out that “[i]t’s our awareness of this predicament that results in the 
absurdity of life. But Camus’ story does not end there. He does want to emphasize 
that our awareness of this vicious cycle in itself prompts victory: ‘Being aware of 
one’s life, one’s revolt, one’s freedom, and to the maximum, is living, and to the 
maximum.’”56 Although Sisyphus does not know the meaning of his “futile and 
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hopeless labor,”57 he does know “the whole extent of his wretched condition,” and in 
this knowledge he is victorious.58 He does not find his reason for living in the dim 
reasoning of his mind. Rather, in his awareness of the absurd and the limits of 
human reason, he becomes interested in what he can know. He knows that he exists 
and that the world exists. He knows he can act and live with passion.  
Similarly, Qohelet grapples with a fallen world in which things “crooked 
cannot be made straight.”59 But he does not accept this fact and turn toward 
despair. After asking the rhetorical question, “Who knows whether the spirit of man 
goes upward and the spirit of the beast goes down into the earth?” Qohelet 
immediately responds with a contented embrace of all that he has—his toil: “So I 
saw that there is nothing better than that a man should rejoice in his work, for that 
is his lot.”60 Here, Qohelet comes to terms with the human condition—his 
limitations and mortality—and in the awareness of his “lot” he finds a certain solace 
and liberation through which he is able to “rejoice in his work.” Aware of what he 
does not know, he turns to action, work–his daily existence. He simply goes on 
living without any resolve or answer to his questions. Qohelet contends that a mere 
spectatorial account of the world cannot provide a full explanation of human reality. 
He transforms from a man of knowing to a man of doing.  
Similarly, Camus contends that the touchstone of human inquiry is not 
through cognitive powers but through the powers of personal experience and 
relationships. An emphasis on the powers of reason disparages the emotional, and 
even the spiritual dimension of human beings. He writes that “reasoning…leaves 
out altogether the most widespread spiritual attitude of our enlightened age.”61 
Here, Camus uncovers the positive implications buried beneath the alienation, 
nothingness, and absurdity that humans experience, and thus he defines his 
existence as a participator in the world rather than a spectator of the world—that 
is, he may truly understand himself through acting and doing rather than thinking 
and knowing. In the attempt to organize the universe and the projects of men, the 
Hellenist overlooks the limits of his system building. He does not notice how the 
sciences cannot humanize the universe or explain away its absurdities. Camus and 
Qohelet, however, recognize that authentic existence entails an honest participation 
in the world, a confrontation with the absurd, and a utilization of one’s freedom—
namely, the choice to live. In his essay “Koheleth and Camus: Two Views of 
Achievement,” Matthew J. Schwartz explains that man’s very decision to live and 
work authenticates existence. For Qohelet and the absurd man, “[t]he world seems 
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alien and threatening, and only by means of his heroic achievements can the hero 
become worthy to surpass or transcend these limitations.”62  
What is true for both of these figures is that they cannot change their 
situation. What they can do is what Camus calls “revolt.” Revolt, the first of three 
positions consequent to a confrontation with the absurd (the other two are Freedom 
and Passion), is “not a refusal to accept the absurd but a decision to live keeping it 
constantly before one.”63 In his revolt, the absurd man indirectly opposes the 
injustice and despair that the absurd gives him. He opposes these effects when he 
decides to keep living in spite of them. In other words, revolt is the “spirit of 
defiance in the face of the Absurd. More technically and less metaphorically, it is a 
spirit of opposition against any perceived unfairness, oppression, or indignity in the 
human condition.”64 Moreover, revolt is a desire for the impossible: “it is Camus’ 
fundamental principle that man’s grandeur and possible happiness lie in his refusal 
to give up his desire for the impossible. If man is to save himself, he must never 
cease to revolt against the limits of his condition at the same time that he refuses to 
pretend that they are not there.”65 Revolt, thus, is the honest awareness of human 
limits, and this is, in turn, an honest confrontation with the absurd, a refusal to 
defeat it or be defeated by it. For both Camus and Qohelet, it is the “the world that 
disappoints”66 that compel them to “revolt” against their fate and choose life. It is in 
the consciousness of limited knowledge that they may truly live, and it is in living 
and becoming, rather than thinking, that they may transcend the absurdity of their 
existence.  
There is certainly a sense of uneasiness in both Qohelet and Camus’ writings. 
Barrett points out that this uneasiness is a central characteristic in the man who 
questions God and confronts his alienation: “deep within the Biblical man,” he 
writes, “lurks a certain uneasiness, which is not to be found in the conceptions of 
man given us by the great Greek philosophers. This uneasiness points toward 
another, and more central, region of human existence than the contrast between 
doing and knowing, morality and reason,” namely the importance for man to 
honestly confront his finitude and mortality.67 Camus, like the biblical man, does 
not seek to resolve the tensions of his absurd existence. Instead, he finds his 
meaning in the uneasiness his finitude creates. He recognizes that these tensions 
are necessary for him to confront and survive the truth of his condition, and, by 
doing so, he may transcend the paradoxical nature of the human experience. Out of 
the uneasiness of the mind Camus turns to the actions of the body—the flesh and 
blood of experience— and focuses on living passionatelyrather than relying on his 
reason to explain life to him. Interestingly, the limitations of human reason do not 
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create more despair for man, but instead lead him to a better grasp of what he 
knows; his humanness and ability to embrace his life.  
The mysteries that remain unknown to Qohelet compel him to find 
“enjoyment” in his toil, the life he does have “under that sun.” The uneasiness 
Sisyphus feels as he climbs his mountain awakens his consciousness and evokes in 
him a “silent joy.”68 Thus, in the end, like Qohelet, Sisyphus chooses life and joins 
the Hebraic tradition by discovering the very meaning of his life in the struggle to 
survive his endless toil; he embraces his condition, rejects surrender, and embodies 
the “Hebraic concept of the man of faith who is passionately committed to his 
mortal being.”69 Sisyphus and Qohelet can only find true serenity the moment they 
come to terms with their relationship with the unsolvable mysteries of the universe. 
As Camus tells us, Sisyphus “is, as much through his passions as through his 
torture.”70 Thus, the very thing that makes life absurd—the limits of his reason—is 
what keeps man alive on earth. It is the very inadequacy of his reason, that which 
once tormented him, which eventually redeems him. The awareness of his absurd 
state, as well as his honest willingness to confront it, authenticates his existence: 
“The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his 
victory.”71 Thus, Camus famously concludes at the end of the essay that the 
“struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart.”72 Qohelet and 
Camus find a way to transcend the absurd by embracing what they do know—their 
potentiality as human agents who can act, eat, drink, and enjoy their work despite 
their limitations. They recognize alienation as a kind of triggering mechanism that 
compels the individual to transcend his finitude. He is interested not so much in 
overcoming his alienation by making the absurd universe his human home, but by 
making his confrontation and revolt against the absurd (and the alienation it 
creates) a “controlling experience”73 that transforms his “alienation to unity.”74  
 When Camus says, “But I do know that, if such a meaning exists, I do not 
know it and that it is impossible me just now to know it,”75 he qualifies this 
statement by using “just now,” thus, leaving “the door open both to the possibility of 
there being such a meaning somewhere and this being possibly communicable to 
him at some time in the future through some faculty or medium of which he 
hitherto had no experience.”76  His inability to know or understand the meaning of 
things at the present moment does not “rule out the possibility of his arriving at 
such an understanding one day in the future though some medium presently 
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unimaginable to him.”77 It therefore becomes man’s limited human reason that 
compels him to keep living, because it is in living that he may gain a knowledge he 
would not have known before.  
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